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Abstract
We revisit the no tie breaking 2-state Galam contrarian model of opin-
ion dynamics for update groups of size 3. While the initial model assumes
a constant density of contrarians a for both opinions, it now depends
for each opinion on its global support. Proportionate contrarians are
thus found to indeed preserve the former case main results. However,
restricting the contrarian behavior to only the current collective major-
ity, makes the dynamics more complex with novel features. For a density
a < ac = 1/9 of one-sided contrarians, a chaotic basin is found in the
fifty-fifty region separated from two majority-minority point attractors,
one on each side. For 1/9 < a . 0.301 only the chaotic basin survives. In
the range a > 0.301 the chaotic basin disappears and the majority starts
to alternate between the two opinions with a staggered flow towards two
point attractors. We then study the effect of both, decoupling the lo-
cal update time sequence from the contrarian behavior activation, and a
smoothing of the majority rule. A status quo driven bias for contrarian
activation is also considered. Introduction of unsettled agents driven in
the debate on a contrarian basis is shown to only shrink the chaotic basin.
The model may shed light to recent apparent contradictory elections with
on the one hand very tied results like in US in 2000 and in Germany in
2002 and 2005, and on the other hand, a huge majority like in France in
2002.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ey, 05.40.2a, 89.65.2s
1 Introduction
In the last years the study of opinion dynamics has attracted a growing number
of works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] making it a major current trend
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of sociophysics [13, 14]. Most models consider 2-state opinion agents combined
with some local opinion update rule which implements the dynamics. They are
found to lead to an opinion polarization of the whole population along one of
the two competing opinions. A unifying frame was proposed to incorporate all
these models [15]. Continuous opinion models yield similar tendency [16, 17].
More recently, the concept of contrarian was introduced to account for some
peculiar behavior of agents [18]. A contrarian is undistinguishable to others,
i.e. its opinion evolves also by local rule updates. However, once it leaves the
update group, it changes individually its opinion to the other one. The shift is
independent of the opinion itself. A contrarian is not a permanent individual
state. Each agent has a probability a to behave like a contrarian and (1− a) to
stick to its opinion. After each cycle of local updates, on average a proportion a
of agents shifts spontaneously their opinion to the other one, while a proportion
(1− a) sticks to its current opinion. Given a fixed density of contrarians a, the
associated opinion dynamics is then studied [18].
As intuitively expected, the existence of contrarians was shown to avoid total
opinion polarization with the creation of stable attractors characterized by a
stable coexistence between a large majority and a small minority. However,
above some low density, they were found to produce an unexpected reversal of
the dynamics, with the merger of the two attractors at the former separator,
turning it to the unique stable attractor [18, 19]. Accordingly, for whatever
initial conditions the dynamics leads to an exact global balance between the two
competing opinions. It thus offers a possible explanation to recently observed
hung election scenario [18]. A hung election being a two candidate run for which
the result is very tied around fifty percent. Chaotic regime was also found in
the description of investors in stock markets [20].
But in today campaigns, polls are regularly publicized making agents aware
of which opinion is currently leading at the global level. It is therefore more
natural to link the propensity to a contrarian behavior to the current level of
global support for a given opinion. Accordingly, in this paper we relax above
constraints of fixed independent contrarian density a in two successive steps.
First, we study the effect on the dynamics making the density a proportional
for each opinion to its current global support. Contrarians become propor-
tionate contrarians. Second, we push the asymmetry further by restricting the
contrarian behavior to only the current majority opinion, contrarians being one-
sided. While proportionate contrarians are found to preserve the mean features
of the fixed density contrarian dynamics, a more complex situation including a
chaotic regime is discovered for one-sided contrarians.
For a density a < ac = 1/9, one-sided contrarians produce a chaotic basin
located in the fifty-fifty percent region. The associated Lyapunov exponent
is calculated. However, there still exist majority-minority coexistence point
attractors located on each side of the chaotic basin. Initial conditions determines
which regime will dominate, either chaotic outcome around fifty percent, or
point attractor with a well defined majority. For 1/9 < a . 0.301 only the
chaotic basin survives. Further, in the range a > 0.301. the chaotic basin
disappears and the majority starts to alternate between the two opinions with
a staggered flow towards two majority-minority point attractors.
On this basis the effect of additional social parameters are studied. A con-
stant shift for contrarian activation is considered. Decoupling the local update
time sequence from the contrarian behavior, and a delay in accounting for a
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change of majority side are also introduced. Last, unsettled agents are included.
They are found to only shrink the chaotic basin making the outcome very tied.
Given above framework, the results may shed light to recent very unusual
hung elections like in the 2000 US presidential vote and in Germany for the
2005 elections. In both cases the outcomes were very tied with almost identical
support. At the same time, the model can also provides an explanation for the
2002 French presidential election where the winner obtained a huge majority
around 80%.
At this stage it is worth to stress that we are able to embody these contra-
dictory voting outcomes within a single frame. But at the same time, we are
not able to decide before hand which one will prevail. To overpass this difficulty
would require the collaboration with social scientists to estimate the actual type
of contrarians involved in a given election.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we review
the original Galam model of contrarians. Throughout the paper, the size of
update local groups is kept equal to three agents. The contrarians are then
made proportionate in Section 3. Section 4 considers one-sided contrarians and
the corresponding complex dynamics topology. Novel features are obtained.
In Section 5 we study the effect of decoupling the local update time sequence
from the contrarian behavior activation. A smoothing of the majority rule is
also included. The effect of a status quo driven bias for contrarian activation
is investigated in Section 6. Section 7 deals with the case of unsettled agents.
Last section contains some discussion.
2 The original Galam model: individual con-
trarians
We start recalling the Galam model of 2-state opinion dynamics model extended
to the presence of contrarians [18]. It considers a population of N agents where
at a time t, NA(t) persons support one opinion A and {N − NA(t)} persons
support another competing opinion B. In terms of global proportions among
the whole population, it yields pt =
NA(t)
N for A and {1 − pt} for B. These
values can be evaluated at any time using polls.
From an initial value pt at time t, a dynamics is implemented in two steps.
First, a neighborhood step where agents are distributed randomly among various
size groups in which they update their respective individual opinion following
the local initial majority [9]. In case of a tie in even size groups, either one
opinion is adopted according to some probabilities [21]. The step is accounted
by a discrete time increment of +1 leading to a new proportion pt+1 of agents
supporting opinion A. The second step is contrarian, each agent individually
either shifts its respective opinion to the other one with a probability a, or
preserves its current opinion with probability (1 − a). This second step yields
an additional increment of time +1 and modifies pt+1 to another value pt+2.
Throughout this paper we explicit the calculations for the case of local groups
with the unique value 3. Above rules thus yield respectively for the first step
pt → pt+1 = Pm(pt) with
pt+1 = Pm(pt) ≡ p
3
t + 3p
2
t
(
1− pt
)
, (1)
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and for the contrarian second step pt+1 → pt+2 = Pc(pt+1) where
pt+2 = Pc(pt+1) ≡ (1− a)pt+1 + a[1− pt+1]. (2)
It should be stressed that before performing another cycle of opinion updates,
agents are reshuffled [22]. Applying above 2-step cycle repeatedly n times re-
sults in a proportion pt+2n of agents supporting A. All possible variations and
extensions of the model can be included within a unifying frame [15].
At this stage we make a change of variable from p to d with p = d + 12 . It
will appear to be more convenient for our investigation. A positive d makes A
the majority opinion while a negative value grounds it as minority with a deficit
|d| of support with respect to B. In terms of the new variable d, Pm(pt) and
Pc(pt+1) become respectively
dt+1 = Dm(dt) ≡ −2d
3
t +
3
2
dt, (3)
and
dt+2 = Dc(dt+1) ≡ (1− 2a)dt+1, (4)
which combine for one full cycle into the single Equation dt+2 = Dc[Dm(dt)],
which we denote by
dt+2 = D2(dt) = (1− 2a){−2d
3
t +
3
2
dt}, (5)
where index 2 of D2 means one local rule followed by one contrarian step with a
time interval of 2 for the dynamics. At this stage such a 2-step split could appear
artificial but it will become instrumental latter on to extend the dynamics to
cases where one cycle is built out of (k − 1) consecutive local updates followed
by one contrarian effect. These cases will be denoted by dt+k = Dk(dt) with
k being the appropriate time interval to study the associated properties of the
dynamics. In the original Galam work k = 2.
For this last case the main results obtained from Eqs. (1,2) or (3,4) are
twofold. At low concentration a of contrarian behavior, total polarization is
prevented with two mixed attractors at which a majority and a small minority
coexist. The threshold for A victory is at pv =
1
2 or dv = 0 which defines the
separator of the dynamics. Furthermore, increasing a provokes a continuous
phase transition at ac =
1
6 turning pv =
1
2 or dv = 0 into the unique and stable
attractor of the dynamics. The final state is a perfect equality of both opinions
at the collective level with on going individual opinion shifts [18].
3 Making contrarian behavior opinion current
status dependent: proportionate contrarians
While the original model considers a constant and fixed proportion a of con-
trarians, it seems more realistic to make it depend on the current state of the
system, in particular due to the existence of published polls. We thus suppose
that if at some specific time t all agents are informed of the actual value of dt,
they react accordingly as contrarians with respect to dt at time (t+ 1) leading
to dt+1. But it thus becomes natural to make the contrarian behavior opinion
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dependent. Not to the opinion itself but to its current level of support in the
population.
To distinguish the associated contrarians from previous ones, we call them
proportionate contrarians. Therefore, agents sharing opinion A react to pt, i.e.,
dt while agents sharing opinion B react to (1 − pt), i.e., −dt. We denote these
rates respectively a(d) and b(d). From symmetry we have b(d) = a(−d) since
opinions are time reversal.
For the time being, we keep our 2-step cycle, which implies a regular and
periodic publication of polls. Such a constraint will be relaxed in a latter Section.
On this basis the proportionate contrarian density a becomes a function of time
through the variable dt. If no agent shares the opinion A, no one will react
against it as a proportionate contrarian yielding the constraint a(d = −1/2) = 0.
On the other extreme at d = 1/2, a(d = 1/2) = a0 where a0 is the proportionate
contrarian maximal value which satisfies 0 ≤ a0 ≤ 1.
Keeping in mind that now the proportionate contrarian density is not the
same at a given time among agents sharing respectively opinion A and B, Eq.
(4) becomes
dt+2 = D2(dt) = (1− at+1 − bt+1)dt+1 +
bt+1 − at+1
2
, (6)
where at+1 and bt+1 respectively mean a(dt+1) and b(dt+1), and dt+1 is given
by Eq. (3).
From Eq.(6) we can extract several properties of the associated dynamics.
First we note that d = 0 is a fixed point if and only if a(d = 0) = b(d = 0).
It means no agent is contrarian at perfect equality of opinions. Second we can
evaluate its stability by studying the value of the associated eigenvalue λ with
respect to one. When d = 0 is a fixed point, it is an attractor when λ < 1,
which in turn implies the condition
6a(d = 0) + a′(d = 0)− b′(d = 0) > 1, (7)
where the prime means a derivative with respect to d. Otherwise when 6a(d =
0) + a′(d = 0) − b′(d = 0) < 1 (λ > 1), the fixed point d = 0 is a separator.
A separator implies the existence of two attractors located respectively on both
side at d > 0 and d < 0 with a stable coexistence of a majority and a minority.
Using above results we can review few specific functional forms for the a
d-dependence. We start with the linear dependence a = a0p = a0(1/2 + d).
For a0 < 1/5, dv = 0 is a separator and the associated attractors are located
at d = ±
√−1+5a0
2
√−1+a0 . When a0 ≥ 1/5, d = 0 becomes the unique attractor
of the dynamics. In other words, the former Galam result is recovered with
proportionate contrarians stabilizing a perfect equality between both opinions
once their density is larger than a critical value, here 1/5 [18]. Results are shown
in Fig. (1).
Considering a power law form a = a0p
γ = a0(1/2+ d)
γ we get the condition
a0 ≥
2γ−1
3+2γ to make d = 0 the unique attractor. It is a separator with two mixed
phases attractors when a0 <
2γ−1
3+2γ . Taking γ = 2 yields a square dependence
with 27 for the critical value of a0. More proportionate contrarians are needed
(a0 ≥
2
7 = 0.286) with respect to the linear case (a0 >
1
5 = 0.20) to produce the
perfect balance of opinions. When d = 0 is a separator, the two attractors are
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Figure 1: Application D2 given by Eq. (6) for the linear and symmetric case
where a(d) = a0p = a0(1/2 + d) and b(d) = a(−d). On the left side a0 = 0.1 <
1/5 with two attractors at coexistence of a majority and a minority. On the
right side a0 = 0.3 > 1/5 with one attractor at a perfect balance among both
opinions.
located at d = ± 12
√
1 + 1a0 (1 +
√
1 + 8a20). On the opposite, taking a square
root dependence with γ = 1/2, yields 1
4
√
2
≃ 0.177 for the critical value of a0
making less proportionate contrarians needed to get the opinion balance as the
unique attractor of the dynamics. The former Galam model considers a = cst.
giving a critical value of 16 ≃ 0.167 which is the lowest value we can get.
At this stage we can conclude that proportionate contrarians do not modify
qualitatively the former constant contrarian density dynamics opinion.
4 Restricting contrarian behavior to the current
majority: one-sided contrarians
On the basis of above results, we go back to the case of a constant density
of contrarians, but now restricting the activation of the contrarian behavior
to only the current majority opinion. It thus yields for d > 0 the conditions
a(d > 0) = a = cst (with 0 ≤ a ≤ 1) and b(d > 0) = 0, while for d < 0 the
conditions are a(d < 0) = 0 and b(d < 0) = a = cst, where we have assumed
symmetric conditions for both opinions. It is worth to note that this symmetry
induces at d = 0 the condition a(d = 0) = b(d = 0) = a2 both preserving
the same total density a of contrarians and recovering here the former original
individual contrarian case. We call these contrarians one-sided contrarians. The
associated rule update writes:
dt+2 = Do−s(dt+1) ≡ (1− a)dt+1 −
a
2
sign[dt+1], (8)
where sign[x] = 1 if x > 0, −1 if x < 0 and 0 if x = 0.
Using Eq. (3) for dt+1 and noting that sign[dt+1] = sign[dt], Eq. (6) writes:
dt+2 = D2(dt) = (1 − a)(
3
2
dt − 2d
3
t )−
a
2
sign[dt]. (9)
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Figure 2: Application D2 given by Eq. (9). Left side: for respectively a = 0.05
in plain line, a = ac = 1/9 in thin line and a = 0.2 in dashed line. Right side:
for a = 0.05, a zoom around d = 0.
At second order in dt it yields:
D2(dt) ≃ λmdt −
a
2
sign[dt], (10)
where λm =
3
2 (1 − a) is the maximal slope of the application D2.
We can now study the associated fixed points and their stability. We first
note that the point d = 0 is a singular fixed point. Then, the application being
symmetric we restrict the study to d > 0. According to Eq. (9), fixed points
exist if a ≤ ac =
1
9 ≃ 0.11 and their values are:
dF± =
1
4
(1±
√
1− 9a
1− a
). (11)
When they exist, dF− is unstable and dF+ stable (see Fig. 2). From Eq. (10)
it gives:
dF− ≃
a
2(λm − 1)
, (12)
with the eigenvalue λ ≃ λm > 1 (λm > 1 for a ≤ ac).
Eq. (10) exhibits clearly condition for expansion when λm > 1, and fold-
ing up by the discontinuity at the origin d = 0. Thus, for being chaotic, the
application D2 has to satisfy two conditions; first, the expansion condition and
second, the perpetuity of the chaotic basin [23, 24]. If the application D2 is
chaotic, the interval of successive iterated points after transients is called Ωl.
Here Ωl =]− a/2; a/2[ (see Fig. 2).
1st condition: expansion.
Inside the interval Ωl the application D2 possesses a slope λ, such as λm >
λ > D′2(a/2), where D
′
2 denotes the derivative of D2 relating to d. This implies
that necessary λm > 1, i.e. a < 1/3. Furthermore, D
′
2(a/2) = 1 for a ≃ 0.27.
According to this unique condition, D2 loses its chaotic nature for a including
to the two last values.
2nd condition: perpetuity of the chaotic basin, i.e. D2
(
Ωl
)
⊂ Ωl.
If there are not fixed points, this condition is automatically satisfied. If fixed
points exist, i.e. for a ≤ ac, they must be outside the interval ]− a/2; a/2[, i.e.
dF− > a/2. According to Eq. (12) it implies λm < 2. This condition is always
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Figure 3: Successive iterated points by the application D2 given by Eq. (9).
Notation here: d(n + 1) = D2
[
d(n)
]
. Left side: a = 0.05 with the initial value
d(0) = 0.05. Right side: a = 0.2 with the initial value d(0) = 0.1.
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Figure 4: Error growth and Lyapunov exponent of the application D2 given by
Eq. (9) in semi-log plot. Notation here: d(n+ 1) = D2
[
d(n)
]
. The initial error
is δ(0) = 10−10, taken after transients. Left side: a = 0.05. From the graph the
Lyapunov exponent is λlyap ≃ 0.353 while ln(λm) ≃ 0.354. Right side: a = 0.2.
From the graph the Lyapunov exponent is λlyap ≃ 0.166 while ln(λm) ≃ 0.182.
satisfied here for group size 3 while it is not the case for larger update groups
from size 5. Nevertheless, to observe a chaotic behavior initial condition must
satisfy |d(t = 0)| < dF−. Otherwise, the successive iterated points go to a stable
fixed point at ±dF+.
A chaotic behavior is numerically observed until a ≃ 0.301. Illustrations are
shown in Fig. (3) for a = 0.2 and a = 0.05 (with an appropriate initial condition
in the latter case).
Fig. (4) shows sensitivity to initial conditions and permits the evaluation of
the Lyapunov exponent λlyap. The initial difference δ(0) grows exponentially,
δ(n) ≃ δ(0) enλlyap , until saturation at the typical size of the interval Ωl. The
Lyapunov exponent is positive with λlyap ≃ ln(λm) as seen from Eq. (10).
The notation adopted in these figures is to consider the nth iteration of the
application D2 since the beginning of the electoral campaign as the equivalent
time n. Thus dt0+2n ≡ d(n), where t0 is the time at the beginning of the
electoral campaign. In other words, d(n+ 1) = D2
[
d(n)
]
.
At this stage we can make the following comments:
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Figure 5: Separators ±dF− of chaotic basin in dashed line and point attractors
±dF+ in plain line, given by Eq (11) as functions of density a. a ≤ ac =
1
9 .
- The discontinuity of the application D2 at d = 0 is not the unique
origin of its chaotical nature. Indeed, we can transform D2 to be continuous
and derivable, e.g. via a→ a(d) = am (1−e
− |d|
α ). If am < 0.301 and α≪ 1 then
this application exhibits a chaotic behavior. Let us recall that sudden variation
is the source of the chaotic nature of the application because it permits the
folding up of an expansive application (if λm > 1).
- When a > 0.311 the application has stable fixed points of doubling
period. They are obtained from D2(d) = −d.
- Increasing a, the first separation for d > 0 inside the interval Ωl in
two intervals occurs at a ≃ 0.056. This result can be retrieved considering
the doubling iterated application D
(2)
2 = D2 ◦ D2, i.e. D
(2)
2 (d) = D2
(
D2(d)
)
.
Indeed, this occurs when lim
d→0−
D
(2)
2 (d) > d
(2)∗, i.e. D2(a/2) > d(2)∗, where
d(2)∗ is a fixed point of doubling period where d(2)∗ is obtained via D2(d(2)∗) =
−d(2)∗. From Eq. (10) we retrieve a ≃ 1 − 2
√
2
3 ≃ 0.057. The extension
of successive iterated points after transients, Ωl, is then, for positive values:
]0;D2(a/2)[ ∪ ]|D
(2)
2 (a/2)|; a/2[.
- Starting for instance from opinion A being initially the majority, i.e
d > 0, we evaluate dch, such as D2(dch)=0. Thus, if d < dch then D2(d) < 0
and the majority side will change to the opposite side; and reciprocally if d > dch
then D2(d) > 0 and the majority side will keep the same side (see Fig. 2). From
Eq. (10):
dch ≃
a
2λm
. (13)
Since successive iterated points are contained into the interval Ωl =]− a/2; a/2[
and D2(a/2) < dch with λm ≤ 1.5, we deduce that d > 0 cannot remain
positive more than twice before turning negative. Note that at second or-
der on d, D2(a/2) > dch yields a second order equation whose solution is
λm >
1+
√
5
2 ≃ 1.62, the golden number.
To summarize, for a < ac =
1
9 this model provides the coexistence of three
radically different basins. A chaotic one located around d = 0 delimited by
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separators±dF− and two others at the extremes with each one a point attractor
±dF+. Fig. (5) shows positions of separators and points attractors as functions
of a. For 1/9 < a . 0.301 only the chaotic basin survives. For a & 0.301 the
opinion forming staggers towards two stable fixed points of doubling period.
Most interesting effects are obtained for a density of one-sided contrarians such
that a < ac =
1
9 . Indeed, in this case the initial value d(0) at the beginning of
the electoral campaign determines which one basin is selected. If |d(0)| < dF−
the intention vote dynamics is chaotic but with a result around d = 0 such that
d ∈] − a/2; a/2[. If |d(0)| > dF−, the issue is certain but with a result at the
extremes. This could account for contradictory electoral outcomes whose results
are either around p = 50% or with a huge majority at p ≃ 80% like the 2002
French presidential election.
5 Varying the time scales of collective informa-
tion and local updates
After having considered 2-step processes, we now study the opinion dynamics
driven by a k-step process where the individual activation of the one-sided con-
trarian step occurs after k − 1 repeated steps of local majority rule update. It
accounts for the fact that polls are not made public every single day during a
campaign while on the contrary people keep on discussing all the time.
Now dt+k = Do−s(dt+k−1) with dt+k−1 = D
(k−1)
m (dt) where D
(k−1)
m = Dm ◦
Dm ◦ · · · ◦Dm, i.e. k − 1 iterations of Dm. In previous sections, k was equal to
2. Accordingly one-sided contrarians consider the collective information with a
delay acting at time t+ k− 1 while considering information at time t. However
they could as well consider the collective information without delay, just after
the last update inside groups at time t + k − 1. Indeed, they act according to
sign[d] (see Section 4) and sign[dt] = sign[dt+1] = · · · = sign[dt+k−1].
Moreover dt+k−1 increases very quickly from the origin d = 0, making a
contrarian behavior without much effect. For instance k = 10 makes the slope
at the origin at (32 )
9 ≃ 38. So, we have to slow down the dynamics driven
by the update rule inside groups in order to study the varying time scale of
collective information. It is done quite naturally assuming that not every agent
eventually changes its opinion to follow the local majority within each cycle of
local updates turning Eq. (1) to:
pt+1 = Pm,w(pt) ≡ w[3p
2
t − 2p
3
t ] + (1− w)pt, (14)
where w denotes the propensity of an agent to be convinced by majority rule
with 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. Using the d variable gives:
dt+1 = Dm,w(dt) ≡ (1 + w/2)dt − 2w d
3
t . (15)
Now k − 1 iterations of Dm,w yields a slower slope at the origin, e.g. for
w = 0.1 and k = 10 it is (1 + w/2)9 ≃ 1.5.
Let a the density of contrarians and w the propensity of an agent to be
convinced by majority rule. The new intention vote dynamics of the k-step
process, generated by the one-sided contrarian step occurred after k−1 repeated
local majority rules writes as
dt+k = Dk(dt) = Do−s
[
D(k−1)m,w (dt)
]
, (16)
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Figure 6: Successive iterated points by the application Dk given by Eq. (16).
Notation here: d(n + 1) = Dk
[
d(n)
]
. Left side: a = w = 0.1, k = 3 and an
initial value d(0) = 0.1. The application is not chaotic. λm ≃ 0.99 < 1. Right
side: a = w = 0.1, k = 18 and an initial value d(0) = −0.04. The application is
not chaotic by escaping from the previous chaotic basin. λm ≃ 2.06 > 2.
where Do−s and Dm,w are respectively given by Eqs. (8, 15). This yields at
second order on dt the Eq. (10), but now with the slope λm = (1−a)(1+
w
2 )
k−1.
To exhibit a chaotic behavior the condition for expansion λm > 1 gives now:
k − 1 >
− ln(1 − a)
ln(1 + w/2)
. (17)
If a, w ≪ 1 and are of the same order, then k − 1 > 2aw , e.g. for a = w ≪ 1,
k > 3. Numerically this can be satisfied until a = w ≤ 0.4 (see Fig. 6).
With respect of the perpetuity of the chaotic basin, the unstable fixed points
(Eq. (12)) are ±dF− ≃ ± a2(λm−1) , if they exist. It implies λm > 1 and λm ≤
1+a to have dF− ≤ 1/2, so, k−1 >
ln( 1+a
1−a )
ln(1+w/2) . If a, w ≪ 1 and are on the same
order, then k − 1 > 4aw , e.g. for a = w ≪ 1, k > 5. Nevertheless, the second
order approximation is not proper as soon as the inequality dF− ≤ 1/2 doesn’t
satisfy |d| ≪ 1.
To check if successive iterated points cannot escape the chaotic basin, i.e. if
dF− > a/2, from Eq. (12) we need to have λm < 2, i.e.
k − 1 <
ln(2)− ln(1− a)
ln(1 + w/2)
. (18)
If a, b ≪ 1 and are on the same order, then k − 1 < 2 ln(2)+2aw , e.g. for
a = w = 0.1, k < 16.9 while numerically, k < 18 (see Fig. 6). As in Section
4, initial value has to satisfy |d(t = 0)| < dF−. However, contrarily to the
precedent section, here successive iterated points can escape the previous chaotic
basin.
In addition, for k > 2, this k-process with k − 1 repeated steps of local
majority rule updates increase naturally the majority side persistency before
changing compared to the previous model.
11
6 Status quo driven bias
Up to now both opinions were perfectly symmetric. However while dealing with
political opinion dynamics in view of an election a difference should be made
between the opinion supporting the current political party in power and the one
supporting the challenging party. The contrarian behavior should be a little
more active against the former winner opinion thus creating a bias in favor of
the challenging opinion [9].
Assuming B is the former opinion winner and denoting s the bias in favor
of the challenging opinion, Eqs. (9, 10) should be rewritten as:
dt+2 = D2(dt) = (1− a)(
3
2
dt − 2d
3
t )−
a
2
sign[dt − s], (19)
and D2(dt) ≃ λmdt −
a
2 sign[dt − s] where λm =
3
2 (1 − a).
In the case a ≤ ac = 1/9 for which fixed points exist, Fig. (7) (a = 0.05 and
s = 0.02) shows that for |s| < dF−, the bias doesn’t modify the position of the
fixed points. But now, depending on the ration s to a, the successive iterated
points could escape from the previous chaotic basin, and thus reach a point
attractor. The values s, at a fixed density a, for which this new phenomenon
occurs, is obtained when Sup
(
lim
dt→s−
D2(dt) ; lim
dt→s+
|D2(dt)|
)
> dF−.
Thus, at first order on s, (a/2 + λm|s|) > dF− and at second order on dt,
Eq. (12) yields:
|s| > sc ≃ a
2− λm
2λm(λm − 1)
, (20)
where here 1 < λm <
3
2 . For instance a = 0.05 gives sc ≃ 2.37% for the exact
value sc ≃ 2.44%.
Evaluating the values s, at a fixed density a, for which successive iterated
points dt have the same sign we find |s| > dch, where dch is defined as D2(dch) =
0 for the application without bias (see Fig. 7). From Eq. (13):
|s| > a
1
2λm
. (21)
For instance a = 0.05 yields |s| > 1.75% for the exact value |s| > 1.76%. It is
worth noting that for s sufficiently large the application is no more chaotic. For
instance, with a = s = 0.2, the application has a periodic attractor of period
13.
Including a bias in favor of one opinion provides two main effects. First
one, after transients, a majority side (in the favored opinion) before changing
more persistent than without bias. Second one, for given density a of one-sided
contrarians, it is possible to escape the chaotic basin without bias to reach the
point attractor of the favored opinion.
7 Unsettled people and contrarian attraction
We now go back to a population where agents sharing either one opinion evolve
by local majority rule updates only without contrarians [9]. But we also consider
another population of agents who do not take part in the public debate. They
are unsettled and hold no opinion. However they are gradually driven in the
12
-0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4
d
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
D
2
H
dL
-0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1
d
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
D
2
H
dL
Figure 7: Application D2 given by Eq. (19) with a status quo driven bias for
a = 0.05 and s = 0.02 in plain line. The dashed line is the application without
bias. At the right side, a zoom of this application around d = 0.
public debate on a contrarian basis. At a constant rate u with 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 they
move to the opinion holding population starting with an opinion opposite to the
current majority. Once they adopt an opinion they become identical to other
sharing opinion agents, i.e., they evolve by local majority rules.
At time t the number of persons sharing opinion A, opinion B and no opinion
are denoted respectively NA(t), NB(t) and NU (t) with NO(t) = NA(t) +NB(t)
and NO(t) +NU (t) = N where N is the total number of agents of both popu-
lations. Associated probabilities are:
pt =
NA(t)
NO(t)
and
NB(t)
NO(t)
= 1− pt. (22)
We still have a two-step process. The first one is unchanged with pt+1 =
Pm(pt) while the second one is produced by the contrarian unsettled agents
partial joining the debate. Note that now the application pt → pt+2 is no longer
stationary. To account for the shrinking dynamics of unsettled agents we note
n the time which corresponds to the nth iteration i.e. dt0+2n ≡ d(n) where t0 is
the time at the beginning of the campaign. Thus, writing d(n+1) = D2,n
[
d(n)
]
,
it gives:
d(n+ 1) = D2,n
[
d(n)
]
=
3
2d(n)− 2d(n)
3
1 + a(n)
−
a(n)
2
(
1 + a(n)
) sign[d(n)], (23)
with
a(n) = u
NU (n)
NO(n)
= u
(1− u)n
R− (1− u)n
, (24)
where R = NNU (0) ≥ 1. For u ≪ 1, on the first order on u
NU (n)
NO(n)
Eqs. (9, 10)
are unchanged with now instead of a an effective time dependent contrarian
density: a→ a(n).
In the limit u ≪ 1 from Eq. (12) we can write, dn,F− ≃ a(n) with Ωl,n
defined for 0 < |d| < a(n)2 . With limn→∞
a(n) = 0 the interval Ωl,n shrinks to 0.
However this model prohibits n → ∞ since the number of unsettled persons
mobilized at each iteration is an integer and not a real one, although the nth
iteration, the number uNU (0)(1 − u)
n is assumed to be greater than 1.
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Figure 8: Applications D2,n given by Eq. (23) with u = 0.02 and R = 2. n = 0
in plain line and n = 1 in dashed line.
In the case (R − 1) ≫ u, a(n + 1) ≃
(
1 − u RR−1
)
a(n) from Eq. (24).
Accordingly points escape the basin bordered by ±dn,F− from time n to n+ 1,
if |d(n + 1)| > dn+1,F− ≃ a(n + 1) implying |d(n)| > (1 − u 3R2(R−1) )a(n) (see
Fig. 8). Thus, if d belongs to the interval Ωl,n at time n, successive iterated
points will be contained into the successive intervals Ωl,n. (see Fig. 9).
Even if successive iterated points do not escape the basin bordered by
±dn,F−, the dynamics is no longer chaotic. Indeed the point d = 0 is now
asymptotically stable. This is due to the non-stationary dynamics effects. Nev-
ertheless, the shrinking dynamics doesn’t affect the sign of iterated d. So, the
expected winner at the issue of an electoral campaign remains unpredictable.
Including unsettled people driven gradually in the public debate on a contrar-
ian basis provides a shrinking of the chaotic basin of the one-sided contrarians
model. Thus, the results may shed light to recent very unusual elections like the
hung 2000 USA presidential and German 2005 elections. Indeed, the winners of
these long electoral campaigns were very unpredictable and the outcomes very
tied.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a simple model giving a deterministic opinion dynamics (see
Eq. 9), which can be chaotic. Furthermore, chaotic basin can coexist with two
point attractors at the extremes. This model contains two main effects. First
effect, amplification one given by the local majority rule inside groups. Second
effect, retroaction one given by the action of the one-sided contrarians. The one-
sided contrarians act by comparison and opposition to a collective information,
the majority. Their action introduces to dynamics a discontinuity.
Afterwards, rooted in this simple model, some others features of electoral
campaigns are added, like the fact that polls are not made public every day,
or a bias in favor of one opinion, or the influence of unsettled people gradually
driven in the public debate on a contrarian basis.
To sum up our various results we come back to the one-sided contrarian
14
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Figure 9: Successive iterated points with D2,n given by Eq. (23) where u =
0.02 and R = 2. Borders ±a(n)2 are included in thin points. Notation here:
d(n+ 1) = D2,n
[
d(n)
]
.
model deterministic equation used throughout this paper:
f(x) = (1− a)(
3
2
x− 2x3)−
a
2
sign[x], (25)
where x ≡ d ∈ [−1/2; 1/2] and a is the density of one-sided contrarians, 0 ≤
a ≤ 1. At the second order on x approximation, with λm =
3
2 (1 − a), f(x) ≃
λm x −
a
2 sign[x]. λm is the expansion effect. The term −
a
2 sign[x] is related
to the folding up, i.e. the retroaction effect. The term −x3 can be seen as a
non-linear saturation effect and gives the point attractors. It is symmetric with
respect to x = 0.
Afterwards, accounting for some others social parameters enrich the model
and modify a little bit its applications. By decoupling the local update time
sequence from the one-sided contrarian behavior activation, the two effects,
amplification and folding up effects, can act separately. Next, a bias in favor of
one opinion introduced as a simple parameter s fixes the discontinuity position at
x = s, i.e., sign[x]→ sign[x− s]. The opinion dynamics is no more symmetric.
Last, unsettled people driven gradually to public debate on a contrarian basis
roughly plays with the folding up effect uniquely; λm ≃
3
2 and a → a(n) with
a(n)→ 0 when n→∞. The opinion forming dynamics is no more stationary.
At this stage it is worth to stress that contrary to what could be expected,
our treatment using probabilities, local updates and reshuffling between updates
does not define a mean field like frame. This result was demonstrate recently
using Monte Carlo simulations of a nearest neighbor ferromagnetic Ising system
on a square lattice [22]. Indeed it creates a new class of universality in addition
to both 2-d Ising and mean field ones. For our current model, in the case of
group size four with no contrarians, using a cellular automata was shown to
recover our analytical result [12].
To conclude it is worth to notice that in terms of real life situations, due to
the finite number of iterations imposed by the fact that any public campaign
is finite in time, the intention vote dynamics will not exhibit a chaotic behav-
ior although in principle it could. In addition, the non zero fuzziness of poll
measurements of the initial intention vote distribution, result automatically in
15
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Figure 10: Combination of a k-step process and unsettled agents with k = 10,
w = 0.05, u = 0.05 and R = 1.5. Initial values are 0.1 in plain line and
(0.1− 0.001) in dashed line.
a growing error making difficult to predict the sign of successive iterations (see
Fig. 10).
Although this simple model does not pretend to account for an exhaustive
explanation of opinion forming during electoral campaigns it exhibits some fea-
tures which could shed new light on recent surprising voting outcomes, like for
instance, on the one hand, an unpredictable issue with a very tied outcome like
the German 2005 and the USA 2000 elections, and on the other hand, a well
predicted outcome with a huge majority like in the 2002 French presidential
elections with a majority around 80%.
However it is worth to stress that at this stage if we are able to embody
above contradictory voting outcomes within a single frame, we are not in a
position to select the prevailing one. To overpass this difficulty would require
the collaboration with social scientists to estimate the actual type of contrarians
involved in a given election. It is open for future work.
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